Question One. Whether the Separated Soul can Understand the Quiddities Habitually Known to it before Separation

1. “Further, one must know etc.” [Lombard, Sent. IV d.45].

2. About this forty fifth distinction I ask four questions:

First whether the separated soul can understand quiddities habitually known to it before separation.

3. That it cannot:

On the Soul 3.7.431a14-17, 8.432a9-10, “Phantasms are to the intellect as sensible objects are to the senses” [cf. Ord. I d.3 n.343]; but the senses cannot have any sensation unless moved by a sensible object;     therefore neither does the intellect have any intellection unless moved by a phantasm. But then [after separation] it will not be moved by a phantasm; therefore etc     .

4. Further, On the Soul 1.4.408b24-25, “Understanding is corrupted when something internal is corrupted;” that ‘internal something’ can only be the organ of imagination; now it is corrupted in death;     therefore understanding is too.

5. Again, only the possible intellect understands, because the agent intellect does not understand; but the possible intellect does not remain after death, because On the Soul 3.5.430a23-25, “the passive intellect is corrupted;” the possible intellect is the passive intellect; therefore etc     .

6. On the contrary:

On the Soul 3.4.429a27-28, “The soul is the place of species [forms], not the whole soul but the intellect;” it is the function of place to keep what is placed in it;     therefore the intellect keeps the species; therefore etc     .

7. Further, Boethius Consolation of Philosophy 5 prose 4 n.25, “The thing received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver;” but the soul that receives the sensible species is incorruptible; therefore it receives them incorruptibly.

8. Further, Avicenna On the Soul p.5 ch.6, “The separated soul will see truth more clearly than the conjoined soul,” and it agrees with Wisdom 9.15, “The body that is corrupted weighs down the soul.”

I. To the Question

A. Opinions of Others

9. There is an opinion here [Aquinas] about understanding by the separated soul through species infused by God; but the treatment of it is proper to the following question [nn.39-44].

10. The opinion about non-infused species, or species acquired in the natural way, seems to be Avicenna’s in On the Soul p.5 ch.6, that without the act of understanding the soul does not remain. For this is Augustine adduced On the Trinity 11.3 n.6, t These words imply that no intelligible species remains habitually in the intellect when the act ceases.

11. Another opinion [Henry of Ghent] is that there is no intelligible species in the intellect but only a phantasm in the imaginative faculty.

B. Scotus’ own Response

12. A treatment of this question is contained at length in Ord. I d.3 nn.340-345, II d.3 nn.355-363.

Hence, from the things proved there [ibid. I d.3 nn.348-378, II d.3 nn.388-394], let there be supposed here: first that an intelligible species is to be posited; second that it remains in the intellect when all act of understanding ceases - nor does it remain only as suddenly passing away, but as possessed under some idea of permanence. But whether it is a habit was touched on there, that when speaking of habit in the sense of some quality inclining to ease of consideration a species is not a habit but precedes it; indeed, it precedes the act by which the habit properly speaking is generated [ibid. I. d.3 n.378, II d.3 nn.378-387].

13. Now how Augustine and Avicenna [n.10] are to be expounded is plain there, because Augustine speaks only of the sensitive faculty that he calls the ‘faculty of cogitation’ [On the Trinity 15.22 n.42], and which will not remain in the separated soul [Ord. I d.3 n.393]. But Avicenna seems to posit a double mode of understanding: by an inferior and by a superior, as is said there [cf. Scotus, Rep. IA d.3 nn.236-238], and knowledge by the inferior indeed abides but not knowledge by the superior.

14. From these suppositions we get this conclusion, that there remains in the intellect in itself, after the act of understanding, an intelligible species.

15. From this the argument goes: in the intellect, as it is subject of the intelligible species, there is not requisite, not even necessarily requisite, a union of it with the body; therefore, when not united with the body, it is not differently disposed as to receiving the intelligible species.

The consequence is plain, because a subject is not differently disposed to receiving something because of variation in what is not the reason for receiving it, nor in any way necessary for receiving it.

I prove the antecedent, because the species is a form simply immaterial or spiritual, at least in that it is not extended and not extendable. Hence the Commentator [Averroes] says [On the Soul III com.18] that the object is transferred from order to order when it is transferred by the agent intellect from the phantasm to the order of the possible intellect [cf. Ord. I d.3 n.359], which I understand only to mean from the order of the material and extendable to the order of the immaterial and non-extendable. But nothing simply immaterial is received in the intellect insofar as the intellect is simply united with the body, because if this were so, it would be received either in the whole first, or union with the body will be a reason for the receiving; whether in this way or that, the thing received will not be thus altogether immaterial.

16. From this I get that the intelligible species can inform the separated and united intellect in the same way. And then further: since the intelligible species, joined with the agent and possible intellects, constitutes in the same way the idea of perfect memory (in the way said elsewhere about intellective memory, that it contains intelligible object and generative intellect [Ord. I d.3 nn.375, 395]) - it follows that a memory of the same idea will be able to exist in the separated intellect as existed in the united intellect; and further, since an equally perfect memory is equally parent of a perfect act in the intelligence, it follows that this sort of generating will be equally able to be present in the separated intellect as in the united intellect. Therefore, the separated soul will be able, by a retained intelligible species, to have actual intellection of anything that it was capable of having intellection of before.

17. With this agrees the intention of the Philosopher, who maintains, On the Soul 1.1.403a3-10, that if the soul cannot have an operation when it is separated, neither can it exist separated. He also puts knowledge properly in the intellect, On the Soul 3.8.431b21-23, saying that “just as the soul is made sensible through the senses, so is it made knowable through knowledge.” Now science is, on its own part, of a nature to abide incorruptibly, and consequently on the part of the subject too, since the subject is incorruptible. But what has science is in accidental potency to actual consideration, from ibid. 3.4.429b31-30a2, Physics 8.4.255a30-b5. Therefore, the separated soul is in accidental potency to understanding objects habitually known to it; therefore it can by itself proceed to act.

18. With this agrees also the statement of Jerome in his prologue to the Bible [Epistle 53 to Paulinus n.9], “Let us learn on earth things the knowledge of which will remain with us in heaven.” For it would be very unfitting to labor so much over science and truths if they ceased to exist in death, and very irrational that they should remain without being able to be actualized.

C. Doubts about Scotus’ Response

19. Against this view there seem to be some doubts.

First, that if many intelligible species be conserved in the intellect, either each of them will move the intellect to consider the object represented by it, or none of them will. The first is unacceptable because understanding many distinct things at once is unacceptable; therefore the second is left, that the intellect will turn out understanding nothing.

20. Besides, understanding without a phantasm is more perfect than understanding with a phantasm (the proof of which is that this agrees more with the understanding of God and angels, which is simply more perfect in the genus of understandings). Therefore, if the separated intellect could understand without a phantasm, it would have an understanding simply more perfect than when conjoined with the body, which is unacceptable.

21. Further, in a conjoined intellect the intelligible species without a phantasm is not sufficient for understanding, because the intellect needs to turn toward phantasms, On the Soul 3.8.432a8-9. But the intelligible species is as equally perfect in a conjoined intellect as in a separated one;     therefore , the species by itself will not be sufficient in a separated intellect for understanding, nor will it be possible then for a phantasm to be had; therefore etc     .

22. Further, an operation proper to the whole cannot be an operation proper to a part, because neither can the total being of the whole belong to a part, but understanding is the operation proper to man, Ethics 1.6.1098a3-4, 7. And there is proof from reason: because the proper operation of this species [man] is not other than this operation, therefore this operation cannot be an operation of the soul, which is only a part of the species.

23. To the first [n.19]: this difficulty (about the understanding of many or no objects first) is a common one, yet in the issue at hand it has a special difficulty, because there is no possibility here of having recourse to particular senses perceiving sensible things, nor to phantasms more or less efficaciously moving the intellect, as is the case with the conjoined intellect.

I say, then, to this briefly here (and consequently about this lack of simultaneousness everywhere), that objects habitually present are either equal in moving the intellect or one of them is a more efficacious mover of it than another. If in the first way, and if there were posited with this an equal inclination of the intellect toward all of them, then the intellect would understand none of them before another - but the hypothesis is impossible. If, however, one of them were a more efficacious mover (after removal of greater inclination in the intellect to one object than to another), then the more efficacious mover will move the intellect first and be first understood. But if one posits an equal inclination toward this object and toward that, then which of them will be understood first appears after one has weighed the moving force and the inclination on each side.

24. To the second [n.20] I say that something can be called more perfect than something else either positively or permissively. An example: animal is more perfect than fly permissively, because the idea of animal permits ‘animal’ to be saved in man; but fly is more perfect positively, because any species posits a perfection over and above the genus.The term ‘animal’ is here being used broadly for any living thing that moves about, and therefore it includes flies and snakes, although we classify flies more properly as insects and snakes as reptiles. ¹¹

To the issue at hand, ‘to understand without a phantasm is more perfect than to understand with a phantasm’ is true permissively but not positively, that is, it does not posit more perfection. The proof is that an agent able to use an instrument does not act positively more perfectly if it not use the instrument; yet it is possible that action without an instrument is more perfect than action with an instrument.Punctuating the Latin as in the translation. The punctuation in the printed text seems misleading. ¹² So it is here with a phantasm, which is a sort of instrument. I concede therefore that intellection without a phantasm has some condition of perfection which intellection with a phantasm does not have, because the former has a likeness with the simply perfect intellection of a separate substance. But it does not follow from this that any intellection of that sort [sc. intellection without a phantasm] is positively more perfect than any intellection of this sort [sc. intellection with a phantasm].Intellection without a phantasm, while simply more perfect, is not more perfect in man’s case than intellection with a phantasm. ¹³

25. To the third [n.21] I say that although the intelligible species in a conjoined intellect is not sufficient without a phantasm, yet not for this reason is a phantasm required there as a principle of the act of understanding; rather it is required there precisely as a principle of the operation of the imaginative power, and this operation is required for intellection because of the connection of the powers in acting (namely the superior and inferior powers), since the superior does not perfectly act about any object unless the inferior powers (those that have power to operate) operate about the same object. And this is the reason that distractions in the powers of the soul about diverse objects impede the operations of those powers.

26. There is however some perfection that a phantasm bestows on intellection, because it regularly intends the intelligible species in any intellection, as was made clear in d.1 nn.44-49 [cf. Ord. I d.3 nn.499-500]. But this perfection can be had without a phantasm, and therefore, to this extent, one must concede that separated intellection would be less perfect than conjoined intellection unless there were something else reforming it that would suffice for restoring an equal perfection.

27. And from this is plain how necessary a conversion to phantasms is, not as to a principle of understanding, but as to that whereby an inferior power has to be used so that a superior power may have its operation; and this because of the order of the powers in acting, which powers must come together in acting about the same object for the acting to be perfect.

28. To the fourth [n.22]: in the case of any whole whose form is not of a nature to exist per se there can be an action proper to the whole that is not able to belong to the form. But contrariwise, in the case of a whole whose form, namely specific form, is of a nature to exist per se, there cannot be a perfect operation that could not belong to the form as the operater; because the most perfect operation cannot be present unless it be present in its most perfect form, and it cannot be present in a form able to exist per se unless it could be in it per se, because the form will be immediately receptive of it; and so, if the form exists per se, it can receive per se.

29. I concede therefore that intellection is the proper operation of the whole man, but according to the most perfect form in him as through the proper principle of operation; nor is this all but, because this form is separable, intellection is so in the form that it can belong to it, and therefore is so proper to the whole that it can belong to the part. I therefore deny the major in the proposed argument [n.22 init.].

30. To the proof about being [n.22 ibid.], although some may say [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.44 q.1 a.1] that the being of the whole is the being of the soul, yet this was disproved above in d.43 [nn.12-25]. Hence I concede that the being of the whole cannot be the being of the soul, nor conversely - speaking of total and precise being. And yet the most perfect operation belongs to this whole because it cannot be in it save according to the soul, and it cannot be in it according to the soul as the soul is proximate receiver unless it could belong to the soul when the soul per se exists. It follows that the operation of the whole can be the operation of the soul; hence I deny the consequence, that ‘the being of this [the whole] cannot be the being of that [the part], therefore neither can the operation of the former be the operation of the latter’.

As to the proof [n.22], that ‘operation presupposes being’: this is true, but not as the precise reason for receiving.A thing cannot operate unless it exists, but the precise reason it has the operation need not be its existence. So the soul, which is not the existence of man but a part of that existence, can yet be the precise reason man has the relevant operation. ¹⁴

II. To the Initial Arguments

31. To the initial arguments.

To the first [n.3]: the authority from On the Soul 3 must be understood as to the acquiring of intellection, and this the first acquisition firstly done. But it must not be understood of use; and the reason is that the intellect can use a form previously acquired, although those things are not had that were necessary before for acquiring the form. The senses, speaking of exterior sense, cannot thus use a form previously acquired, because the senses do not conserve for later operation a form or species previously received. In another way it could be said that this proposition [of the Philosopher] is understood as holding of this life, because the Philosopher knew by experience the intellection that fits us only for this life; for he had experience of no other.

32. To the second [n.4]: the intellect is corrupted, that is, impeded in its operation, and it is as if it is kept corrupt by something corrupted within, for without the operation of imagination it cannot proceed to its own act. But from this does not follow that it is corrupt or corruptible in itself, nor that something else is necessarily required for its act, but only that it is required according to the order of powers that is now found in human nature as to operation on the same object.

33. To the third [n.5] I say that the passive intellect is not there understood to be the possible intellect, but to be some sense power, which power some call the cogitative power. And it is true that every sense power is corrupted, and therefore that the passive intellect, taken in this way, is corrupted too. But the passive intellect is not corrupted in the sense in which we say the possible intellect is passive.